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More than forty years ago Paul Schroeder stated that ‘[t]he status of Habsburg studies in 
the United States could easily be described in one word “flourishing”’.1 Surveying just a 
small portion in the wave of recent books on the Habsburg Monarchy and its successors – 
many from American scholars – a more effusive word is required to describe the present 
state of the field. The current historiography is very different from when Schroeder wrote 
his review essay for the 1967 Austrian History Yearbook (AHY) conference. Then, there 
was a widely accepted view that the Monarchy’s nationality conflicts had fatally 
weakened its strength and thus led, directly or indirectly, to its eventual dissolution.2 The 
principal elements of this paradigm were set by Oscar Jaszi in his classic The Dissolution 
of the Habsburg Monarchy published just eleven years after the end of the Monarchy. 
Jaszi concluded ‘that the collapse of the Habsburg Empire was not anything surprising 
but rather the long continuance of this amalgamation of peoples without a common state 
idea, based on the mutual hatred and distrust of the various nations’.3 Jaszi attributed the 
collapse of the Monarchy to internal factors, isolating three as the most important: rising 
nationalism, a feudal class which prevented reform and ‘the lack of any serious civic 
education’.4 
 In the last three decades the historiography has challenged all three of Jaszi’s 
points. The study of nationalism has been transformed (mostly through constructivist and 
cultural approaches); the political system interpreted as relatively open, flexible and 
participatory; and the loyalty to the Emperor and the Monarchy reassessed. Pieter Judson 
has recently termed this change in Habsburg historiography a ‘quiet revolution’.5 
Beginning in economic history, much of this revision has roughly followed the leisurely 
progress of the massive series, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918.6 Originally 
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conceived in the 1950s, the series has presented lengthy, detailed and authoritative 
articles on a wide variety of topics, including the neglected areas of bureaucracy, legal 
system, parliamentary life, constitutional government and, most recently, the public 
sphere and civil society. In addition, key works from American scholars such as John 
Boyer, Gary Cohen, Pieter Judson and others have also contributed to undermining 
Jaszi’s negative assessment and have redirected research away from the overly schematic 
study of centripetal and centrifugal forces (significantly the 1967 AHY conference 
adopted Jaszi’s framework). For example, in a recent article surveying the Monarchy’s 
political development, Gary Cohen wrote that: 
[t]he evolution of constitutional, representative government in the Austrian and 
Hungarian halves of the monarchy and the growth of a wide spectrum of political 
parties and interest groups demonstrates a broad process of modern political 
development during the half century before WWI.7 
 
Cohen argues that nationalist loyalties co-existed with a continued allegiance to the 
Habsburg state.8 Instead of centrifugal forces tearing the Monarchy apart, Cohen suggests 
that ‘most political groups in Austrian society [competed] for influence and control over 
parts of the state’.9 He therefore views nationalism as part of a vibrant, developing 
transformation of civil society and political life.10 Somewhat akin to Margaret 
Anderson’s work on Imperial Germany, Cohen and other recent historians of the 
Habsburg Monarchy have argued that instead of a deficient political system, Austria – 
like Germany – had developed a legitimate, functioning Rechtsstaat and a participatory, 
diverse and communal political culture.11 
 Of the books under review, the works by Rottenbacher, Binder, Mills Kelly, 
Unowsky, Wingfield, Glassheim and Okey all pursue variants of these ideas. The 
revisionist view does not necessarily deny the growing importance of nationalism (indeed 
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many of the works under review retain the assumption of increasing nationalisation in 
public and private life) nor the numerous, profound challenges the Monarchy faced in the 
decades leading up to WWI, but merely notes that these challenges did not necessarily 
oppose or prove fatal to the continued existence of the Austro-Hungarian state. The 
monographs by Zahra and Judson introduce a new element, recasting the nationality 
question by emphasising ‘national indifference’ and its role in spurring nationalist 
activists. In place of the accepted view of rising, populist, mass, radical nationalism, 
Zahra and Judson highlight the difficulties faced by the nationalist activists as well as the 
continued bilingualism, indifference and pragmatism in much of the population. Finally, 
the books by Coen and Frank pursue their subjects with only occasional references to 
nationalist issues (Frank more than Coen). To some extent their work moves beyond the 
national question where it is a peripheral issue. This review essay groups the books into 
four sections: first, traditional political history; second, interpreting nationalist politics as 
a cultural system; third, ‘national indifference’ as an important element; and, fourth, 
nationalism as a mere background issue. 
Taken together the books under review provide a variegated, rich and nuanced 
portrait of the Monarchy which stresses ‘contingency, constructivism and complexity’.12 
Over the last decade the sheer wealth of research on the Monarch has led to a remarkable 
pluralism where the nationality question is increasingly placed within its context, rather 
than being the overriding issue.13  




 Bernd Rottenbacher’s book – a publication of his doctoral dissertation under 
Harm-Hinrich Brandt – evokes the world of political manoeuvring, electoral organizing, 
government influence and, most interestingly, the actual mechanics of the voting 
procedure. In traditional historiography, the Austrian political system – its constitution, 
parliament and electoral process – was judged harshly.14 Rottenbacher’s carefully 
researched book provides much missing detail about the 1860s, a decade crucial to 
Austria’s political development yet surprisingly neglected in the literature. While not 
explicitly positioning his work against the existing historiography, Rottenbacher’s 
explanation of Austria’s gradual adoption of democratic institutions and the formation of 
political camps promotes a more balanced assessment of Austria’s political system. 
 Rottenbacher’s study contrasts politics in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Bohemia 
was the classic site of the Monarchy’s nationality conflict. In the 1861 elections, 
however, this was not yet clear, as evidenced by a verfassungstreu, centralist Czech Franz 
Scebek and a federalist German Anton Porak. (219)15 Fairly quickly, though, the 
respective central committees took over and these anomalies disappeared as two distinct 
camps began to dominate: the centralists (or Verfassungstreu) and the federalists (the 
Czechs and conservatives). The Czech central committee, based around their press organ 
Narodni Listy, portrayed itself as the opposition party and set the standard for discipline 
in candidature and mobilization. The extensive network of Czech organizations, 
especially Sokol, emphasised the importance of Czech solidarity and rights. By tracing 
voting patterns, Rottenbacher emphasises the degree of homogeneity and continuity in 
Bohemia’s electoral constituencies. For the period covered, from 1861 to 1871, only 26 
seats changed sides, mostly in the towns and mostly due to government influence. In fact, 
 7 
for a region known for national conflict, at this early stage of political development, there 
were very few swing seats to fight over. Thus the important battle was often within the 
nationalist camps. Rottenbacher also notes that apart from the crucial Great Landowners 
curia, Bohemia had a structural majority for the federalists’ camp. 
 Rottenbacher emphasises that the Great Landowners’ curia was the hinge of 
Bohemian elections and indeed the Reichsrat, at least until 1873, as Hoebelt has argued.16 
The Great Landowner curia had a small, quantifiable number of voters and was always 
the last to vote, often a few days after the country, town and chambers of commerce curia 
so it provided the easiest and most effective means for a government to manipulate the 
result, as was famously done in March 1867 to create a Verfassungstreu majority 
favourable to the already agreed Ausgleich with Hungary. In mid-March Archduke Carl 
Ludwig personally met with leading nobles in Prague, then Brno/Brünn, to outline the 
Emperor’s wishes.17 (117-8) Count Beust, recently installed as Foreign Minister, stated 
simply that ‘the Emperor has spoken, the Emperor calls!’(116)  
 There were other levers the central government used to influence elections, as 
Rottenbacher makes clear. Bureaucrats could be candidates or be directed to vote en bloc, 
official newspapers and anonymous pamphlets circulated, sanctioned speeches given, 
police observation directed. Less subtle, more effective but also more controversial, were 
changes to electoral regulations and the tax threshold for voting. When drafting the 1861 
system – in great haste and based on previously compiled information – Schmerling 
wanted a system where the result could be calculated and the government could exert 
subtle but decisive influence. (70-83)  
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Electorally, Moravia was very different from Bohemia. The Great Landowners’ 
curia was more amenable to the government and soon developed a government-friendly 
Middle Party. There were, however, a much greater number of possible swing seats in 
Moravia, especially in the town curia. Similar to Bohemia, the central committees 
quickly dominated political life. Silesia, on the other hand, had more stable election 
results where the Deutscher Verein dominated politics. 
Rottenbacher’s work raises a number of important correctives. While the 
traditional focus on the state and constitutional question is understandable, 
Rottenbacher’s study shows that detailed investigations of elections, electioneering and 
electoral behaviour can be extremely fruitful.18 He notes that politics was primarily 
organised according to the abstract state rights (which overlapped substantially with 
nationalities), not the familiar cleavages of town and country or religion. Polarisation 
came from above and the many homogeneous, mono-national constituencies partly 
explain the constant battles within political camps and the desire for a completely new 
constitutional system. Above all, Rottenbacher explains how the political system actually 
functioned and what concrete effects it had on subsequent development, rather than 
postulating possible alternative solutions to the Monarchy’s constitutional and political 
situation.  
Eagle Glassheim’s book concentrates on the Bohemian nobility, who, despite 
some changes to the electoral procedure, ‘in the 1880s … still held a towering position in 
Habsburg society and government.’ (2) He charts their adjustments to modern life and the 
drastic changes in political and state rule from the fading grandeur of the Habsburg 
Empire in the 1880s to the radical communist reforms in Czechoslovakia upon their 
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takeover in 1948. The nobles were by no means passive; updating their estates, forming 
political and lobbying groupings, all with the general aim of ‘changing to stay the same’. 
(13)19 While the Bohemian nobles were prepared to keep pace with the new economic 
and political conditions, their social customs and practices became ever more exclusive in 
the modern age. Intermarriage between families, hunting on their extensive country 
estates, socializing at the Jockey Club in Vienna and the Ressource Club in Prague were 
all indicators of noble social standing. 
Politically the main camps in Habsburg Bohemia remained centralists and 
federalists. Yet as the options narrowed and politics in Bohemia hardened along more 
nationalist lines, the Bohemian nobility adopted aspects of national belonging, either the 
Czech or German camps. This was exacerbated by the stance of the young Czechoslovak 
state formed out of the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Czechoslovak state based 
its legitimating ideology on a particular middle-class, democratic Czechoslovak view of 
history, the official line fought against possible monarchist and German separatist 
tendencies, especially within the Bohemian nobility. The Land Reform Bill of 1919 and 
the State Land Office provided a focal point for both noble activism and the 
‘nationalizing’ nature of the Czechoslovak state. While the nobles sympathetic to 
Czechoslovakia relied on lobbying – including President Masaryk, his ministers and the 
officials at the Land Office – the German nobles used their international contacts and 
placed their faith in the League of Nations and its procedure for protecting minorities. 
Glassheim shows how the nobles, while retaining aspects of internationalization and 
social cohesion, were increasingly forced to choose national sides. 
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The early 1930s were a respite for the embattled nobles as conservatism 
reasserted itself. In 1938 with Hitler’s radical reorganization of the Central European 
map, there was the predictable split in attitudes. Many German nobles, who had 
increasingly coupled their cause to the plight of the Sudeten Germans, welcomed the 
formation of a greater Germany, whereas the Czech nobles, in two brave but futile 
declarations of 1938 and 1939, professed their loyalty to the Czechoslovak state. As 
Glassheim notes, these declarations were against their material interests and prevailing 
power relations, thus betraying a profound loyalty to the Czech nation. (150-2 and 199-
200). 
The end for the Bohemian nobility came in two stages, first the expulsion of 
Sudeten Germans (including many German nobles) and appropriation of their property 
immediately after WWII  and, second, a radical process of land reform spearheaded by 
the Communists which eventually led to the fragmentation of Czechoslovak country 
properties and the end to all large noble landholdings. Most nobles used their 
international connections to leave Czechoslovakia but a handful stayed and took various 
menial jobs in the Communist state. 
Glassheim’s work plots the transition from diversity to relative homogeneity in 
Central Europe over the course of the late-nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century. 
This chronology is similar to Jeremy King’s book on Budweis/Čseké Budějovice and has 
been adopted by some historians of the Bohemian lands (for example, Wingfield and 
Zahra among the books under review).20 His concentration on a small group of important 
actors as they negotiated changing conditions enables detailed understanding and 
demonstrates the advantages of collective biographies. Along with recent work from Rita 
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Krueger and Ralph Melville, it forms a trilogy of monographs on the Bohemian nobility 
with the only period missing, ironically, their period of greatest Imperial influence from 
the 1850s to the 1880s.21 
T. Mills Kelly’s book focuses on the rise of the radical Czech National Social 
Party in the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy. He places the Czech National 
Socials firmly in the political, social and economic context of the Monarchy’s move to 
mass democracy and modern industrial conditions. Mills Kelly identifies a number of 
reasons for the Czech National Socials’ relative success. Most important was the party’s 
voting support mostly found in the geographic areas which had modernised early, had 
attained a high standard of living, but had subsequently lost their position relative to other 
areas. These ‘objective conditions’ of rapid development and commensurate prospects, 
followed be a relative fall in fortunes created the seedbed for a Czech National Social 
voter. Another factor, according to Mills Kelly, was the asymmetric political structure in 
early twentieth century Bohemian politics. While equal, universal suffrage was 
introduced into the Reichsrat in 1907, the Bohemian Diet and local council elections 
continued to be held under the curia system. In effect, this allowed the radical, populist 
politics a forum as a minority party in the Reichsrat’s Czech club but denied them any 
chance of participation in regional or local government. Thus the politics of the street and 
of opposition – mass demonstrations, clashes with the police and with German speakers, 
mock trials – could be used by the National Socials to present themselves as the 
legitimate leaders of the Czech nation, unsullied by involvement with the Viennese 
government (like the Young Czechs) or a commitment to internationalism (like the Social 
Democrats). Ideologically, as well, there was space for the National Socials’ message of 
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Czech nationalism, anti-Semitism, social reform, anti-militarism (hence mildly anti-
Habsburg) and egalitarianism (hence pro-women voting). Indeed, the National Socials 
pushed for a complete transformation of Czech life and the full democratization of public 
life. 
Mills Kelly, like Lothar Höbelt on the German radical nationalists, stresses the 
opportunistic and often pragmatic nature of late Imperial mass politics, where despite 
heated rhetoric and violent street demonstrations, the political leaders remained open to 
electoral and parliamentary alliances.22 The best example is the electoral arrangement 
between the National Socials and their bitter rivals, the Young Czechs, in the 1911 
Reichsrat elections. Echoing Rottenbacher’s observation, Mills Kelly argues that the 
mostly mono-national constituencies in Bohemia contributed to radical politics ‘without 
remorse’. (132) The 1907 electoral redrawing of the boundaries emphasised this electoral 
separation, thus turning Czech parties against one another, while their anti-German 
rhetoric showed no signs of abating. Mills Kelly is illuminating about the rise of Czech 
radical nationalism and its place in the Monarchy’s political process, but he does not 
engage fully with the larger issue of radicalisation throughout the Monarchy and the 
possibility of the state’s continued existence. In his conclusion he notes that the zero-sum 
game of Czech politics, where compromise was perceived as failure and radical 
politicians often outflanked more moderate voices, was a bad style of politics and a grave 
legacy to leave the new Czechoslovakian state. More on these continuities with later 
politics would have been illuminating. 
Galician politics was dominated for many decades by the conservative Polish 
nobles and, in many respects, had the characteristics of the periphery – slower social, 
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economic and cultural development. Its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional character, 
Binder argues, not only brought conflict but adaptation, accommodation and a certain 
notion of Galician identity. 
The orientation of nationalities as a construct was at least for the later years 
absolutely fundamental, but the national differentiation did not mean that there 
wasn’t mixing, plurality and ambiguity in the realm of cultural identity. (24) 
 
Binder divides his work into a strict schematic structure with four main sections – Parties, 
Elections, Fractions and Representatives – and many sub-sections. While aiding clarity, 
the separation of themes and subjects sometimes obscures the inter-related web of 
connections and relationships which made up the Galician political system. For example, 
little is made of the connection between the Polish Central Committee, set up for 
elections, which directly fed into the powerful, parliamentary Polish Club. (190-201 and 
321-36) He barely touches upon the overlapping functions of important politicians who 
were often members of the electoral committee, party executive and parliamentary 
fraction. Similarly in his analyses of the 1897, 1900-01, 1907 and 1911 Reichsrat 
elections – while there are good individual discussion of the campaigns, changing issues 
and electoral results – there is little sense of how Galician democracy and politics 
functioned on the ground; the formation of electoral committees, selection of candidates, 
organisation of campaign rallies, the interaction between different candidates, the 
procedure at polling day and the varied responses to the results. This is partly due to 
Binder’s thematic, panoramic approach but also reflects his major primary sources – local 
and Imperial newspapers alongside parliamentary and administrative records. Binder 
does not use party archives or politicians’ personal papers – indeed there is little on 
individuals, even such a prominent figure as Stanisław Stojałowski. Instead, Binder 
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concentrates on structural relationships (conservatives/democrats, 
Russophiles/Ukrainophiles, German Jews/Polish Jews) and long-term processes (mass 
politicisation, the formation of democratic structures, elite formation). 
His work, nevertheless, provides an excellent, albeit lengthy, introduction to 
Galician politics from the 1890s to the end of the monarchy. Polish, Ruthenian and 
Jewish politics are investigated in depth and with considerable insight. There are 
extremely thorough and detailed discussions of individual Reichsrat elections from 1897 
to 1911 with telling examples from individual constituencies. His discussion of ‘Galician 
Elections’, where accusations of official electoral corruption were widespread, is 
particularly revealing and is similar to Rottenbacher’s observations on 1860s Bohemian 
politics as well as long-standing views on Hungarian elections.23 Similarly the fractions 
in parliament are covered for each parliamentary session from 1897 to 1918 with the 
Polish Club’s fortunes forming the central narrative thread. In general the Ruthenians 
grew in parliamentary strength as their number of representatives increased and they were 
prepared to use obstructionist tactics. More on the relative strength and activity in the 
Galician Landtag would have broadened the picture on the Polish/Ruthene conflict in 
these years. The weakest section is on the representatives where Binder’s sociological 
analysis of Polish, Ruthenian and Jewish representatives based on age, confession, jobs, 
education and various other categories uncovers nothing particularly revelatory. 
Ultimately Binder’s painstaking work has provided a comprehensive study which, while 
not rethinking the field, is a solid base for investigating Galician politics.  
Robin Okey’s book on the Habsburg Monarchy’s occupation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina is based on contrasting and competing visions of development. On one side 
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was the Habsburg ‘civilising mission’ which gave moral  legitimacy to the Monarchy’s 
policy of preventing the development of a large South Slav state as a dangerous 
neighbour; on the other side were the three nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the Muslims, 
Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats – who believed in their own higher destinies. Yet, as 
Okey continually stresses, the story of occupation was not simple; it had many subtle 
nuances as well as regional commonalities. Okey places the Habsburg civilising mission 
squarely within Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism; namely Western arrogance about 
bringing rational, universal values to primitive, undeveloped peoples. 
 In the first chapter, Okey provides an excellent background to the difficulties 
faced by Austria-Hungary when it occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. In particular 
the three contrasting communities of Bosnian Muslims, Orthodox Serbs and Christian 
Croats each had their particularities, feuds and hierarchies. Quite early in the occupation 
the government followed the familiar Habsburg integration policy of combining a 
cultural and progressive mission coupled with reliance on local religious hierarchies to 
maintain control. Thus the immediate primary goals were the establishment of a strong, 
prestigious administration and gaining control over the three religious hierarchies. Both 
goals proved difficult to achieve. For example, the administration’s attempt to found 
inter-confessional schools struck the minefield of an entrenched, confessionally 
structured society while the administration’s religious appointees proved stubbornly 
independent. Dissatisfaction erupted in 1882 when, because of agrarian and tax 
grievances, first the Serbs, then the Muslims staged a substantial insurrection in 
Herzegovina. This ushered in the imposing figure of Benjamin Kállay who would run the 
provinces from 1882 to his death in 1903. 
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 Kállay’s regime was built on a paradox; the belief in the integrating effects of 
religious tolerance within the framework of a progressive, modern society, counterposed 
with a constant fear of insurrection and dissent, especially from the Orthodox Serb 
population. His approach was thus an awkward combination of strong government (stick) 
and civilising mission (carrot). The heart of the book lies in the three separate chapters on 
Kállay’s policies and attitude towards the Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Interestingly, 
Kállay probably had the most success with the Muslims where a significant section of the 
intelligentsia welcomed European influences and became at least partly Austrophile. In 
dealing with the Serbs, Kállay’s academic work and experience working in the Austrian 
embassy in Bucharest proved to be of little help. His attempt to control the religious 
community met with resistance, while Serbian nationalism only grew in response to his 
strong government. The Catholic Croats were torn by a feud between Archbishop Josip 
Stadler and the traditional religious leaders, the Franciscan order. In addition, to maintain 
the appearance of confessional equality Kállay occasionally intervened against the 
Catholic Church. These difficulties came to a head during the late 1890s as both the Serbs 
and Muslims pushed for autonomy and the government’s increased use of the secret 
service laid bare the failure of Kállay’s policies. 
Okey’s work positively reassesses the policies of Kállay’s successor, István 
Burian, describing them as ‘distinctive and considered’, if also somewhat conservative, 
inflexible and based on the false assumption that the elites controlled their respective 
constituencies. (191) Autonomy was granted to the Serbs and in 1910 a constitution with 
a representative, regional Diet came into effect. Inevitably, once the provinces were 
annexed in 1908 and brought within the Monarchy’s complicated and delicately balanced 
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dual constitutional system, many parties wanted influence in its administration and 
politics.  
 The final two chapters are written in the shadow of Gavrilo Princip’s fateful 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Clearly the ‘civilising mission’ had not 
worked. Instead of promoting enlightened citizenship within and loyalty to the Habsburg 
state, secondary schools had become focal points for discontent, dissent and activism. 
Student groups such as Young Bosnia (Princip belonged to a breakaway group) sprang up 
advocating violence and freedom from Austrian oppression. Okey brings the reader to the 
precipice but does not recount the familiar story of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination. His 
assessment of the ‘civilising mission’ is succinct: “[w]ith the training of minds had not 
come a winning of hearts”. (247) While there were successes in infrastructure, urban 
growth and the economy, Western education was often seen as undermining native 
development. For many within Bosnia-Herzegovina, ‘progress’ would preferably be 
through nationalist institutions, not a Habsburg cultural mission. 
 Okey’s work adds much to the historiography of the Habsburg Monarchy. There 
has been little in English on the Bosnia-Herzegovina administration and none have 
covered it in such breadth, depth and detail. Indeed, some small sections could easily 
have been expanded into chapters of their own. Okey’s ability to compress information is 
admirable if occasionally wearisome in its constant wealth of detail. His career has been 
the inverse to the norm – from very broad canvas to large synthesis to focussed 
monograph.24 This volume, a reworking of his doctoral dissertation submitted thirty years 
ago, caps his distinguished career in Habsburg historiography.  
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     *** 
 
In her ambitious, wide-ranging book, Nancy Wingfield uses a strong 
‘constructivist’ approach to analyse the increasing symbolic possession of public space, 
asserting that ‘ …[all] national claims are the product of strategies, stories, narratives, 
monuments, holidays and other cultural artefacts.’(14) Her overriding question is how the 
politicization of local cultural and social life, through statues, memorials, holidays and 
celebrations, led to nationality becoming the key to all aspects of everyday life.  
The first chapter, which charts the changing Bohemian view of Joseph II, 
provides a good example of Wingfield’s argument. In the few decades after Joseph’s 
reign, the official memory of a well-meaning, overworked ruler co-existed with the 
popular memory of the Volkskaiser who had passed progressive decrees (including the 
lifting of serfdom). The German liberals of the mid-nineteenth century, however, claimed 
a different aspect of Joseph’s protean legacy – his desire for a centralised, unified and 
rational state. When the liberals’ unexpected and debilitating loss in the 1879 Reichsrat 
elections coincided with the 100 year anniversary of Joseph’s accession to the throne, the 
Bohemian German liberals used the erection of Joseph II statues to symbolise the 
continuing strength of the German community and its importance to the Austrian state. 
While peasants were occasionally involved in these ceremonies, the general trend was a 
move from a historic figure with multiple meanings to the celebration of a German saint, 
the unofficial patron of Bohemian Germans. 
The next chapter, on the Bohemian German demonstrations surrounding the 
Badeni Decrees, emphasises the increasing use by both Czechs and Germans of the 
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language of exclusion. Wingfield argues that a pattern of violent demonstrations was 
developing and that fear for the loss of status drove the Bohemian Germans towards 
becoming one community, a Volksgemeinschaft. The remaining chapters trace how these 
intertwined processes of increasingly dominant nationalism and more exclusionary, 
proprietorial national rhetoric played out in the Bohemian lands. Wingfield concentrates 
on the flashpoints – Brno 1905 over the Second Czech University, the contested 1908 
Francis Joseph Jubilee, the foundation of the Czechoslovak nation-state in the immediate 
aftermath of WWI, national holidays in inter-war Czechoslovakia and the 1930 riots over 
German sound films in Prague. Her discussion of Czechoslovakia is particularly good.25 
Like Glassheim, she classifies Czechoslovakia as a ‘nationalising state’ – constantly 
legitimating its existence by using the past and erasing inconvenient symbols (mostly 
German, Habsburg and sometimes Catholic) to promote one national vision. Wingfield is 
understandably critical of this exclusionary vision which found no room for Germans, 
Catholics, Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians (along with many Bohemian nobles as 
Glassheim has highlighted). In a later chapter Wingfield describes the Sudeten German 
attempt at constructing their own exclusive community in the 1930s under the aegis of 
the increasingly Nazi Sudeten German Party. 
Wingfield provides a different slant to a familiar story; of the breakdown between 
Czechs and Germans, of exclusionary, racial, proprietorial rhetoric where there was once 
co-existence and acceptance. The coverage, while admirably broad encompassing film, 
holidays, statues and flags, is so varied that the book occasionally loses focus, not helped 
by some narrative jarring (for example, the Czech legionnaires, who fought on the side of 
the Russians in WWI, are discussed in relation to the immediate post-WWI riots in 
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Chapter Five but are only really explained in the following Chapter Six). In general, 
Wingfield concentrates on how the differing authorities and organisations mobilised 
people, without investigating who the people in the crowd were, what motivated them 
and how they perceived and understood the various demonstrations, celebrations, 
holidays and national events. For example, the cinema riots involved a minority of Czech 
Fascist agitators, while many ‘loyal Czechs’ simply wanted to enjoy some sentimental 
German-language film in the latest technology. This ambivalence could have been more 
deeply discussed. Nevertheless, her book is a welcome addition to the new literature on 
Czech-German relations and considerable widens the scope for further research.  
Daniel Unowsky’s book focuses on imperial celebrations and the image of the 
Emperor Francis Joseph. By analysing the Imperial visits to Galicia and various 
anniversary celebrations in Vienna, Unowsky argues that there were concerted efforts at 
projecting the Emperor’s image and that these efforts changed over time as different 
groupings became involved and the general political situation developed. Thus Unowsky 
compares the 1851 Imperial visit to Galicia – when the army, police and court combined 
to convey the Emperor’s grandeur, magnificence and control over state power – with 
Francis Joseph’s three week visit in 1880, which was stage-managed by Polish 
conservatives to portray Polish achievements under a conservative-dominated, 
administratively autonomous Galicia. Significantly, whereas the military and the police 
had been responsible for security in 1851, a Polish citizen’s guard kept order during the 
1880 visit. There were, however, challenges to this dominant 1880 Polish conservative 
narrative, principally from the Ruthenians but also to some extent from the region’s Jews. 
Francis Joseph duly visited their respective religious buildings and met Ruthenian and 
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Jewish representatives during his visit. Unowsky argues that this contestation for the 
Emperor’s patronage intensified for a short visit in 1894 reflecting the heated political 
situation, but regrettably he does not analyse this 1894 trip in any depth. Indeed there are 
few voices from the crowds themselves and how their reception of the Emperor may have 
changed with differing circumstances or, indeed, stayed much the same despite the 
political manoeuvring behind the scenes. 
 The section on the revival of religious rituals and Imperial ceremony in the neo-
absolutist era is particularly compelling. This laid the template for the Imperial Court’s 
representation of Francis Joseph as a pious yet superior ruler. Over the years, especially 
after the violent deaths of Crown Prince Rudolph and Empress Elisabeth, this image was 
adjusted to incorporate these personal tragedies. Emphasis was now placed on Francis 
Joseph’s sacrifice, perseverance and sense of duty while his own human characteristics 
were further obscured behind the official line. It was this basic image which was 
disseminated through schools, voluntary associations and local councils. Nevertheless, as 
Unowsky demonstrates, there continued to be politically motivated contestation over 
Imperial patriotism. For the 1898 celebrations, nearly all of which were cancelled due to 
the Empress Elisabeth’s assassination on 10 September 1898, the recently installed 
Christian Social council in Vienna attempted to remake the Emperor’s image and define 
patriotism along Christian Social principles (namely mild anti-Semitism, opposition to 
Pan-Germanism and Socialism). 
 The overall argument of increasing contestation for Francis Joseph’s image is 
convincing (and contrasts with Wingfield’s nationalising of symbols) but a more detailed 
discussion of the 1908 celebrations would have strengthened Unowsky’s book. It is 
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strange that the centrepiece of the book – three chapters on the 1898 anniversary 
celebrations – is about events which were planned but mostly did not take place. His 
book is a reminder of the continued loyalty to the dynasty and the key position of the 
Emperor within the monarchy’s complex, fluctuating system. 
 Wingfield’s and Unowsky’s books form two sides of the same coin. Wingfield’s 
cultural analysis of nationalist riots, demonstrations and holidays obviously differs from 
Unowsky’s similar approach for Imperial celebrations, visits and representations. Both 
aspects co-existed in the Monarchy and in all probability even shared participants – in 
many towns, mayors and local notables would, for example, attend the unveiling of a 
Kaiser Joseph II statue as well as an Imperial visit. Unowsky neatly states that in the 
Monarchy ‘dynastic patriotism and national belonging were presented as mutually 
reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive’. (3)  
 
    *** 
 
Tara Zahra’s innovative book inverts the traditional arguments of mass, radical 
nationalism from below in the final decades of the Monarchy and argues that the 
nationalists were spurred to increasing radicalism by the masses’ indifference and 
ambivalence towards nationality. Thus ‘ … indifference to nationalism [should be] a 
central category of analysis, a driving force behind historical change in East Central 
Europe’. (4) Indifference to politics was not new; Rottenbacher noted that for the 1861 
elections the most common complaint in reports from the Landgemeinde was the 
disinterest of electors.26 However, especially for the turbulent early to mid-twentieth 
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century, national indifference has rarely, if ever, been seriously discussed. Zahra’s book, 
along with her former teacher Pieter Judson’s, should prompt a reassessment of the 
nationalisation process in Central and Eastern Europe.27 
Zahra highlights the interaction between pragmatic, flexible, nationally 
ambiguous, ambitious parents and the respective Czech and German nationalist visions as 
a site for the shaping of democratic ideals, minority rights, the modern welfare state and 
ideas of ethnic purity. By concentrating on the children who were bilingual – products of 
mixed marriages and in constant contact with both Czech and German speakers –  Zahra 
demonstrates the extreme fluidity of national loyalties despite the continual attempts by 
both national sides and the different state regimes to ‘objectively’ classify the population 
according to nationality. Zahra argues that despite the radical changes in political 
regimes, strong continuities existed in nationalist thinking and practice as well as 
fundamental similarities between the two nationalist movements. Instead of the 
traditional representations of Masaryk’s Czechoslovakia as a beacon of liberal democracy 
and the Third Reich a brutal, racial oppressor, Zahra argues that the roots of many 
nationalist policies for children in both regimes can be traced to nationalist theory, 
rhetoric and organisation from the later years of the Monarchy. 
The first chapter outlines the change from liberal assumptions on schooling in the 
mid nineteenth century (namely, nationalism and religion were a matter of the private 
sphere) to the early twentieth century, when after decades of nationalist politics, the idea 
prevailed amongst national activists that children belonged primarily to the nation, not to 
any private sphere or parental realm. Bilingualism, parental pragmatism and national 
indifference were condemned by nationalists as exhibiting a lack of character and moral 
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degeneracy. Both nationalist movements raised funds, built schools and promised gifts in 
a bid to maximise student numbers in their respective, segregated school systems. The 
German nationalists, with echoes of their liberal heritage and centuries of state and 
cultural patronage, welcomed as many children as possible into their school with the 
promise of upward social mobility and the possibility of assimilation. The Czech 
activists, on the other hand, wished to retain as many children in the Czech-language 
education system and insisted that there would be no disadvantage with future prospects. 
Thus segregated educational systems co-existed and a vicious culture of national 
denunciation within national communities developed. The Moravian Compromise and the 
Lex Perek entrenched this national segregation and empowered administrative authorities 
to determine a child’s nationality based on ‘objective characteristics’.28  
This combination of state sanctioned national segregation and growing social 
welfare infrastructure along nationalist organisational lines continued and strengthened 
during the difficult war years from 1914 to 1918. In the last years of the Monarchy, 
nationalist activists functioned as privileged mediators between the state and their 
respective national communities. These trends continued and deepened in the new 
Czechoslovakia with one crucial difference; the state was now firmly on the side of the 
Czech nationalists – indeed, Czech nationalism provided a basis for the country’s 
legitimacy – and the ‘objective’ ascription of nationality became heavily biased in favour 
of the Czech side. Collective rights underpinned Czechoslovakian institutions and 
membership was determined by Czech authorities. There were two strands to the Sudeten 
German response – paralleling many similar positions in the nineteenth century – the 
negativist Heimat movement, which denied legitimacy to the Czechoslovakian nation-
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state, and the positivist work of the German Provisional Commission for Child Welfare 
(DLS), which worked with the Czechoslovak authorities. Gradually, in the 1930s, the 
Sudeten German Party, which was always close to the Heimat movement, infiltrated and 
took over the DLS. 
Nazi practice in the Sudetenland and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 
involved a radical racial reordering of the region but, argues Zahra, in fact followed many 
local traditions of nationalist activity. Thus national classification under the Nazis 
resembled the procedure in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Czechoslovak state, though 
there was more space to be politically loyal to Nazi Germany while remaining Czech. 
National indifference, side-switching and pragmatic choices about allegiances continued. 
In particular, Sudeten Germans slowly became disappointed at Nazi education policies 
which prioritised the war effort over the threat from the Czechs at home. Committed 
Czechs, on the other hand, called for a defence of their ethnic purity and, in a reverse of 
the previous suspicion of pragmatic parents, entrusted Czech mothers with the correct 
Czech upbringing of their children. Zahra highlights the rather paradoxical Nazi 
Kuratorium for Youth Education which organised summer camps and mass 
demonstrations for Czech youths, all in the spirit of Czech nationalism, in order to 
engender Czech loyalty to the Third Reich. There was some measure of success with this 
policy, though this Reich-loyal Czech nationalism has been largely been neglected by 
researchers. 
In a short epilogue Zahra looks at the immediate post-WWII situation and argues 
sweepingly that ‘[e]thnic cleansing was not just a radical solution to national conflict in 
Europe: it was a final solution to the persistent problem of national hermaphroditism and 
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ambivalence’. (264) Only national purification could solve the problem of diversity, 
bilingualism and national flexibility. In Zahra’s account, the national activists, especially 
when they had the backing of a powerful state machine (whether Czechoslovakia or the 
Third Reich), took centre stage as they battled the other side and their own nationally 
indifferent populations. 
Her book is a sophisticated, empirically rich study on nationalist claims for 
children and forces a substantial reassessment of the nationalist struggle. National 
indifference (indeed, political indifference) should be a consideration in any discussion of 
the region’s history. Yet there are still unresolved issues. The nationalists’ own records 
and publications can certainly be used counter-intuitively to demonstrate national 
indifference. But how much was this an internal strategy or rhetoric appealing to fellow 
nationalists to renew their efforts in the face of unresponsive parents and the general 
population? Though it would be difficult to estimate, how widespread was national 
indifference? Indeed in comparison to other political movements (Socialism, 
Agrarianism), how did radical nationalism fare in the scramble for political mobilisation? 
Nationalist aims were so all-encompassing – every person to be absolutely committed to 
one nation – that activists were bound to fall short and be disappointed. While segregated 
educational systems and social welfare networks definitely entrenched national 
communities, the initial segregation clearly had nationalist motivations. In other words, 
the nationalist dynamic as described by Zahra – nationalist activism met with relative 
indifference leading to national radicalism – is predicated on the existence of strong 
nationalist activism by at least some part of the population. These nationalist movements 
recruited large numbers of followers, as Mills Kelly and Wingfield make clear, so there 
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must have been a certain latent nationalist sentiment in at least a significant part of the 
population. At the very least there was a large spectrum of national belief and 
indifference. Overall Zahra’s book is an impressive achievement which not only 
challenges existing paradigms of nationalist politics but pioneers the study of childhood 
in Central European historiography. 
In Pieter Judson’s book rural nationalist violence in Bohemia and Southern Styria 
(now part of Slovenia) during the final decades of the Habsburg Monarchy is subjected to 
similar intense investigation and questioning. Judson poses thorny questions which, like 
Zahra, challenge the existing paradigm of the politicised masses pushing for change by 
extra-parliamentary means. Who actually participated in the violence? Did the 
participants have nationalist motives? What larger meanings did local communities attach 
to the violence? Combining analytic approaches from literary studies, cultural 
anthropology and critical theory (in particular Foucault) with meticulous historical 
scholarship, Judson draws the veil from nationalist mythmaking and attempts to give 
voice to the silent object of the nationalisation process – the rural population. Like Zahra, 
he asserts that national indifference, flexibility and acceptance remained strong factors, 
despite the increasing nationalist rhetoric and radical tactics of the politicians and 
activists. In line with current research (which he partly inspired) Judson writes that 
language frontiers and nationality were not eternal and natural but had been created by 
the specific combination of Imperial censuses, an embattled Austro-German elite and 
increasing nationalist rhetoric. 
When bourgeois nationalism confronted the bilingualism, social fluidity, national 
indifference and pragmatism of rural, mixed-language regions, the national activists on 
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the language frontiers privately complained of unreliability yet publicly praised the 
heroic behaviour of their brethren on the frontline. Potent symbols such as schoolhouses, 
buildings and statues laid claim to the landscape as ‘national property’ 
(Nationalbesitzstand). Judson is particularly good on the common, coherent narrative 
structure which had evolved to explain schoolhouse attacks. The main elements were an 
unprovoked attack, threats to children and the calm, level-headed response of the teacher. 
Yet in reality the ‘attack’ may only have been, in essence, a drinking prank, such as in 
Lichtenwald/Sevnica in Southern Styria.(58) Nevertheless, for the national activists and 
their press, every misunderstanding, insult or violent incident took on national 
significance, even when the incidents may not necessarily be nationalist in motive. 
Nationalist rhetoric postulated fixed language frontiers and claimed territory as ‘national 
property’ but, Judson asks, did the rural population really become nationalist? 
The agents of national activism were the newcomers to rural Austria – teachers, 
civil servants, doctors, railway workers, among others – who often brought a double 
vision of modernity and national community. Thus nationalisation, for the activists, had a 
moral basis and terms such as education, hygiene and commerce were extolled as 
national virtues. The modernisation process, Judson argues, should be decoupled from 
nationalism. (7-8) Throughout the book Judson uncovers the rhetorical structures which 
underpinned the nationalist Weltanschauung. This is particularly the case with a focused 
chapter on nationalist violence over three days in 1908 in the predominantly German-
speaking, Bohemian villages of Bergreichenstein/ Kašperské Hory and Schüttenhofen/ 
Sušice. He contrasts three separate accounts – the Czech, German and government 
versions. The Czechs blamed the violence on provocative German policing, a mob of 
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German students (as well as some notables) and the collusion of the German-majority 
municipal council – a familiar trope of overbearing German authorities and arrogant 
German bourgeoisie. The Germans accused the Czechs of inciting the clash, Czech civil 
servants for organising the Czech crowds and Czech troops for using excessive force 
leading to a death at the hand of the gendarmes. Here the calm, moderate German 
students are contrasted with the provocative, hot-headed Czech gendarmes. Finally, the 
government reports tried to minimise the nationalist significance and to concentrate on 
the facts. Judson emphasises the creation of these differing yet coherent dramatic 
narratives. He also places much of the blame on bourgeois participants, especially the 
students and activists, who pushed for confrontational situations that could conceivably 
lead to violent incidents. In fact, as a district administrator’s report made clear, many 
locals were more concerned that their market day had been disrupted. 
Judson also looks at nationalist tourism. Südmark, which was reasonably 
successful with an expensive colonisation plan at St. Egydi/Sv Ilj, trumpeted their 
flagship programme and encouraged visitors to this ‘model of national community’. (128) 
Of course, St. Egydi also laid claims to territory and formed part of a projected linguistic 
bridge between the majority German-speaking areas of Styria and the ‘language islands’ 
of Marburg/ Maribor, Cilli/ Celje and Pettau/ Ptuj. In Bohemia, Höritz/ Hořice na 
Šumavč was the subject of Böhmerwaldbund publicity advertising its annual passion 
play. Yet there was considerable ambivalence in such tourism because, while overt 
national activism was generally good for the tourist trade, the play’s effect was 
emotional, even religious, not necessarily national. 
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In his final chapter on World War One – which is more speculative than the 
others – Judson identifies a turning point when, because of different conditions and the 
nationalised welfare systems, the nation truly entered into daily life. The successor states, 
which based their legitimacy on claims to be a single nation, took the final step in 
territorializing the landscape by claiming national borders as political borders. The effects 
and policies were, of course, localised but the steps towards the radical population 
practices of the mid-twentieth century had taken place. In their stimulating works, Zahra 
and Judson raise important questions about the exact operation of nationalism within the 
general population and everyday life. 
 
    *** 
Alison Frank’s book charts the competing visions of Galicia through the little 
known story of the rise and fall of Galicia’s oil industry. It reached the dizzying heights 
of the third largest oil producing region in the world, accounting for 5% of the world’s 
production in 1909, only to decline inexorably afterwards. It is a compelling narrative 
told from a number of perspectives: Austrian, Galician and local; heroic oil barons and 
poor workers; big foreign capital and small amateur investors; the Austrian military and 
suffering oil workers in World War I; the Poles, Ukrainians, British and French in the 
unstable post-1918 world. Above all, Frank is careful to convey the complexity and 
diversity of the Galician oil industry. 
 Frank begins her work with a characterisation of Galicia containing familiar 
elements. While a constitution and regional diet were in place from 1861, economic 
backwardness and the conservative Polish landowners’ iron grip on power translated into 
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a poor province wedded to agriculture. Like Binder, Frank mentions the social injustice 
and electoral abuse which was rife in Galician politics. However, Frank’s account 
perhaps underemphasises the real and growing opportunities for social mobility and civic 
participation that existed amidst the poverty and entrenched hierarchies of Galician life.29 
 In the early years of the Galician oil industry, roughly from 1862 to 1884, the 
central government in Vienna was not particularly interested in this peripheral good only 
used for lighting, and let the Galician Diet determine regulations. The principle of private 
rights, rather than crown control, prevailed and issues of land ownership, private property 
and local control dominated the industry. For a number of reasons, mostly related to 
private ownership of rights, the industry did not flourish and in 1884 an Imperial 
Petroleum Law was introduced combining state supervision and private control. 
 The stage was set for the boom years of Galicia’s oil industry. Large oilfields 
were found and fortunes made. Legendary oilmen made their names in the 1880s, men 
such as Stanislaw Szczepanowski, born in Prussian Poland who worked for years in 
London, and William McGarvey, originally from Canada and the introducer of modern 
drilling technology to Galicia. Szczepanowski’s tale is a cautionary one. A committed 
Polish patriot – Szczepanowski dreamt of being a ‘Polish Cavour’ – he regarded ‘oil [as] 
an opportunity to rescue Poland’. (89) He believed it could lead to the economic and 
spiritual rebirth of the Polish nation. A member of the Imperial Parliament and the 
Galician Diet, Szczepanowski – never the most orderly of businessmen – neglected his 
business while the Galician Savings Bank, run by another Polish patriot, continued to 
fund Szczepanowski based on his reputation. In 1899 there was a run on the bank and 
Szczepanowski’s ruinous finances were laid bare to the public. Frank shows how the 
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Szczepanowski scandal not only involved purely financial issues, but also questions of 
national regeneration, Galicia’s future and Polish patriotism. 
 Frank’s chapter on the oil workers is bracing and convincing. ‘One thing’, she 
writes, ‘is clear: oil workers did not act as Galicia’s revolutionary class.’ (109) Most 
workers, Frank argues, were itinerant, often disregarded safety regulations and held 
national and confessional identities above any putative class consciousness. The 
occasional riot often had anti-Semitic undertones rather than any workers’ movement for 
fundamental reform.  Even the extensive strikes of 1904 had little socialist influence. By 
the turn-of-the-century Galicia’s oil industry had transformed and become big business. 
Discovery of new massive oilfields in the 1890s and 1900s (including the famous ‘Oil 
City’), more investment (including big foreign capital), developing technology plus a 
potent combination of too many companies and too little co-ordinated action led to an 
epidemic of overproduction and a catastrophic fall in prices. Despite state-sponsored 
recovery of prices, the oil industry would, unbeknownst to most experts, enter into 
terminal decline. 
 World War I only emphasised the gradual slide in production, to the extent that in 
1917 the Central Powers, including the Austro-Hungarian navy which had committed 
itself to oil-powered ships on the back of Galician oil, reached crisis point. The 
overproduction before the war had also prompted increased private consumption which, 
coupled with military requirements during the war and dwindling reserves, exacerbated 
the recurring difficulties in the Galician oil industry (transport cost, lack of vertical  
integration, expensive refinery costs). When – after WWI, fruitless negotiations in Paris 
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and civil war – Eastern Galicia officially became part of Poland in March 1923 its oil 
industry was in terminal decline. 
 Frank’s book reads like a moral fable of economic backwardness, lack of legal 
structures and a heady recklessness which meant the oil industry never regenerated the 
region (or greater Poland) and has not left many lasting traces. Her careful study suggests 
that while nationalism was important, it was merely one factor among many. 
 Nationalism barely makes an appearance in Deborah Coen’s ambitious, multi-
layered, fascinating work covering a century of Viennese intellectual history through the 
lens of the remarkable Exner family. Addressing an array of academic disciplines 
including philosophy, education, Roman law, colour theory, physics, neurophysiology, 
biology and meteorology, Coen identifies an underlying preoccupation to these diverse 
investigations – probabilistic reasoning. Coen argues that in an increasing secular world 
the Exners plotted a course between religious dogmatism and radical relativism by 
confronting and managing uncertainty in a multitude of contexts and scientific fields. (2-
6) According to the Exner family’s mantra, a clear-sighted and rigorous education based 
on empirical science would equip an individual with the ethical character to critically and 
independently engage with an uncertain world and to exercise freedom responsibly. (229-
53) Family life, especially the culture of the summer retreat (for the Exners, their beloved 
Brunnwinkl in the Salzkammergut), was an integral component of a truly liberal 
upbringing. The final goal was an individual with Vielseitigkeit and a cohesive society of 
uniquely gifted people which, Coen believes, may have been highly achievable at the 
utopian retreat of Brunnwinkl but ultimately impossible through a rigid classroom on a 
mass Imperial scale. (337) 
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 While the Exner family members have not been neglected in their respective 
fields, Coen is the first to deal with the family as a whole. Similar to Karl Heinz 
Rossbacher’s recent book, which covered five prominent Jewish (from roughly the same 
milieu as the Exners and with many social and familial connections), this approach often 
facilitates unexpected and fruitful juxtapositions, especially in the relationship between 
science and culture, such as Coen’s discussion of colour theory and the Secession.30 
Occasionally these ingenious connections seem forced. For example, in chapter five, 
Coen uses the themes of inheritance to weld together discussions on the law, biology, 
constructed family narratives, the ‘universality’ of education and women’s rights. Were 
these separate, relatively discrete fields conceived (deliberately or subconsciously) as part 
of a larger issue? This comes to the heart of the book. By emphasising the overarching 
theme of probability reasoning, which Coen asserts dominated from the 1840s to 1940s, 
she perhaps underemphasises the specificity of the various, separate investigations. 
 Nevertheless, Coen’s book is a considerable achievement and contributes to the 
ongoing assessment of Austrian liberalism. In particular, it focuses attention on the role 
the natural sciences played in the Bildung ideal of the liberal reformers. It also reinforces 
the sheer scale of the liberal project. In 1846 Franz Exner, the founder of the academic 
dynasty, half jokingly rhapsodised about the liberal future: 
Fresh air began to blow through the land … On its currents came free speech … 
trade and industry flourish inside and out and multiplied Austria’s honour and 
power. Each of us had a wife and sons. (55) 
 
The final sentence points to another important corrective highlighted by Coen; the 
importance of family life to creating a society of ethical, liberal, free individuals. Her 
discussion of the summer retreat is particularly apposite and reveals an aspect not often 
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dealt with in historical works. Indeed, throughout the book there is a tangible feeling for 
the texture of everyday life within Vienna’s privileged Bildungsbürgertum. 
     
    *** 
 
Near the end of Act I in Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s and Richard Strauss’s very Viennese 
opera, Der Rosenkavalier, the Marschallin muses: ‘It is in the ‘how’, there lies the whole 
difference’. Nearly all the books accept the growth and importance of nationalism but 
they differ in explaining how it developed and how its dynamics worked. Rottenbacher, 
Mills Kelly, Glassheim and Binder focus on politics and how – through organisations, the 
press, parties, campaigns, fractions and elections – nationalism began to dominate the 
political scene. Okey’s approach is more traditional; outlining the state’s grand project of 
integration, the difficulties and resistance it faced, then its ultimate failure. Wingfield and 
Unowsky explain how national contestation for public symbols, space and ceremonies 
evolved. Zahra and Judson both point to national indifference as a spur to national 
activists. Judson’s work is the most subversive, hinting at widespread indifference and 
ambiguity, yet in his final chapter he concedes that in WWI the state effectively become 
nationalised. Finally, Frank and Coen pursue their respective investigations with the 
national question as a background issue. 
 Clearly nationalism was an important issue in the later years of the Monarchy and 
for the region throughout the twentieth century. It will no doubt continue to be the subject 
of research and debate. However, with the EU, accepted state borders and less political 
contestation, perhaps there is an opportunity to step back and reassess the outlines of the 
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Monarchy’s history and legacy – to create a new framework which places nationalism not 
above everything else, but within the intricate matrix of issues arising in the latter 
decades of the Monarchy and continuing into the successor states. Already at the 1967 
Austrian History Yearbook conference, the comparative historian Raymond Grew 
suggested that ‘nationalism was less the cause [of the Monarchy’s difficulties] than 
another reflection of the political and social difficulties the empire faced’.31 
Conceptualising a wider framework, while also incorporating the tremendous variety of 
recent research and viewpoints, presents a stimulating and difficult challenge for any 
historian of the region. 
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